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PREVIEW: Vote Solar v. Montana Department of Public Service
Regulation: Standards of Review for Decisions Under the Montana
Administrative Procedure Act.
Lindsay A. Mullineaux*
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in
this matter on Wednesday, February 26, 2020, at 9:30 a.m. in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana. Ann B. Hill will likely appear for the
Appellant, Northwestern Energy, and Justine W. Kraske or Zachary T.
Rogola will likely appear for Cross-Appellant, Montana Public Service
Commission. Jenny K. Harbine will likely appear for Appellees, Vote
Solar and Montana Environmental Information Center, and Marie P.
Barlow will likely appear for Appellee, Cypress Creek Renewables,
LLC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case involves the Montana Public Service Commission’s
(“Commission”) implementation of federal and state laws designed to
promote development of small, renewable energy facilities, which
includes establishing the rates utility companies must pay for power
generated by such facilities.1 The parties have extensively briefed the
issue of whether the Commission reasonably established rates and
contract terms for NorthWestern Energy’s (“NorthWestern”) purchases
from certain small, renewable energy facilities in Montana.2
However, the threshold issue for the Court is whether the district
court exceeded the scope of judicial review in vacating and modifying
the Commission’s decision.3 This case represents the first time the
Commission has determined a solar capacity contribution rate, and the
resolution of this case will impact development of and investment in
independent solar farms in Montana.4

* Candidate for J.D. 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana.
1
Appellees’ Response Brief at 2, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation (Mont. Sep.
30, 2019) (No. DA 19-0223); Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub.
Serv. Regulation (Mont. Aug. 2, 2019) (No. DA 19-0223).
2
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1.
3
Id.
4
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation
(Mont. Sep. 13, 2019) (No. DA 19-0223).
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In Montana, utility purchases of energy from small energy
production facilities are governed by state statutes implementing the
federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”).5 PURPA was
enacted in 1978 with the goal of encouraging development of renewable
energy sources and reducing the nation’s dependence on any single
energy source.6 PURPA requires utilities to purchase energy from
qualifying small power production facilities—known as “qualifying
facilities” or “QFs”—at rates that allow the QFs to become and remain
economically viable.7 The utilities then recover the costs of these
mandatory purchases directly from the consumer.8 Under PURPA, the
rates “(1) shall be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the
electric utility and in the public interest, and (2) shall not discriminate
against qualifying cogenerators or qualifying small power producers.”9
Essentially, PURPA creates an “avoided cost standard,” where utilities
must pay a rate for energy from QFs that reflects the costs the utilities
would otherwise incur to develop or acquire generation capacity (i.e.,
capacity costs) and/or produce or purchase energy (i.e., energy costs).10
The Commission is tasked with implementing PURPA.11 Under
Montana law, the Commission is mandated to establish standard rates for
the subset of very small QFs at issue in this case—those with capacity of
3 megawatts or less.12 The Commission sets rates based on avoided costs,
which includes calculating capacity contribution rates—a determination
of the percentage QFs contribute of their overall generating capacity to
NorthWestern’s needs.13 The Commission also sets contract terms and
conditions.14 While the Commission has discretion in establishing these
terms, the Montana Legislature has set forth a policy stating the
Commission shall encourage long-term contracts to enhance the
economic feasibility of QFs.15 Due to fluctuations in the market,
Montana utilities file applications to update these standard rates every
two years.16

Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2018).
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
7
Id. at 3.
8
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
9
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 3 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)).
10
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
11
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 3.
12
Id. at 3–4.
13
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 28.
14
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
15
Id.
16
Id.
5
6
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The Commission last updated NorthWestern’s rates in 2014.17 On
May 3, 2016, NorthWestern filed its biannual application with the
Commission, which requested a significant decrease in standard rates for
QFs.18 Also before the Commission was the issue of whether to reduce
the maximum length of standard-offer contracts between Northwestern
and the QFs.19 After conducting a hearing and reviewing the record, the
Commission issued an order establishing off-peak rates at $25.37 (down
from $53.14), peak rates at $34.47 (down from $92.73), and establishing
a solar capacity contribution of 6.1% (previously undetermined).20 The
order also lowered the maximum contract length from 25 years to 10
years.21 Appellees moved for reconsideration.22 On reconsideration, the
Commission affirmed its decision except with regard to maximum
contract length, which was increased from 10 years to 15 years.23
Concerned with the effect of the lowered rates on the economic
viability of QFs, Appellees sought judicial review of the reconsidered
order through the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”).24
On April 2, 2019, Judge Manley of the Eight Judicial District Court,
Cascade County, vacated and modified the Commission’s decisions,
holding the Commission’s rate calculation was arbitrary and unlawful
and the Commission’s reduction of standard-offer contract lengths was
unsupported by the evidence.25 The decision was remanded to the
Commission with instructions to direct NorthWestern to identify new
standard rates and contract lengths consistent with the district court’s
findings.26 NorthWestern and the Commission appealed.27
III.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Appellant’s and Cross-Appellant’s Arguments

NorthWestern, Appellant, and the Commission, Cross-Appellant,
(collectively “Appellants”) each argue the Commission’s rate and
contract length decisions were reasonable, supported by evidence, and
17

Id. at 5.
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 7.
19
Id. at 8.
20
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 8, 18.
21
Id. at 18.
22
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 9.
23
Id. at 10.
24
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 17; see also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2–4–101 to
2–4–711 (2019).
25
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 10; Order Vacating and Modifying Montana Public
Service Commission Order Nos. 7500c and 7500d at 1, Vote Solar v. Montana Dep’t of Pub. Serv.
Regulation (Mont. Apr. 2, 2019) (No. BVD-17-0776) [hereinafter Order].
26
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 10–11.
27
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 3.
18
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consistent with federal and state law.28 Appellants contend the
Commission correctly applied the historically used proxy method to
establish Northwestern’s avoided energy and capacity costs.29 Appellants
claim that, in applying this established method, the Commission
correctly revised NorthWestern’s avoided energy costs based on updated
market price forecasts without utilizing a carbon adjustment.30
Appellants further contend the Commission correctly applied the
industry-standard exceedance analysis, the same method utilized by
Southwest Power Pool (“SSP”), which oversees the electric grid and
wholesale power market in the central United States, to set the solar
capacity contribution at 6.1%.31 Regarding contract length, Appellants
assert the 15-year maximum contract term is sufficient to support QF
project development.32 Appellants hone in on the fact that Montana
public policy requires the Commission “to enhance the economic
feasibility”;33 therefore, “the policy is not to make financing guaranteed
at specified terms, but to make financing of the QF project possible.”34 In
sum, Appellants maintain the Commission’s decisions were the result of
correct applications of the proxy method and the exceedance analysis and
adequately balanced the needs of QFs with both the interests of utilities
and the interests of consumers.35
Appellants further contend that, while the district court has
jurisdiction to review Commission decisions, the district court exceeded
the scope of judicial review by taking on “the legislative function of
ratemaking.”36 Appellants maintain Judge Manley overstepped by
disregarding the Commission’s technical expertise and fact finding
responsibilities37 and erred in vacating and modifying the Commission’s
decisions rather than remanding the decisions to the Commission for
further proceedings.38 Additionally, Appellants insist the district court
incorrectly applied the standard of review for informal agency
proceedings, which evaluates whether decisions are “arbitrary,
capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial evidence,” rather
than the standard of review for contested proceedings, which typically
Id. at 22; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10–11.
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10.
30
Id. at 10, 13.
31
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 8.
32
Id. at 17.
33
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 69–3–604(2)
(2019)) (“Long term contracts . . . must be encouraged in order to enhance the economic feasibility
of qualifying small power production facilities”).
34
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17.
35
Id. at 10–11.
36
Id. at 20.
37
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 21.
38
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20.
28
29
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involves a substantial evidence standard for findings of fact and a de
novo standard for conclusions of law.39 Appellants stress that, in
reviewing Commission decisions, courts should continue to adhere to
these well-established standards of review and refrain from incorporating
new principles.40
B.

Appellees’ Arguments

Vote Solar, Montana Environmental Information Center, and
Cypress Creek Renewables, LLC (collectively “Appellees”) contend the
district court correctly held the Commission’s rate and contract lengths
were arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful.41 Appellees assert the
Commission did not fairly compensate solar energy resources for energy
generated.42 Appellees specifically argue the Commission failed to
accurately compensate QFs for avoided costs by excluding from
calculations future regulatory costs associated with carbon dioxide
emissions that NorthWestern avoids by purchasing energy from noncarbon emitting QFs.43
Further, Appellees contend the Commission’s application of the
proxy method was arbitrary and unlawful because it failed to fully
compensate QFs for the operating costs of new resources NorthWestern
planned to construct in 2019.44 Moreover, Appellees assert the
Commission’s application of the SSP methodology in calculating the
solar capacity contribution arbitrarily focused on a handful of infrequent
and short-lived peak demand hours in the winter, where solar farms
contributed less to NorthWestern’s system capacity, thereby overlooking
regional demand and solar contributions in the summer months, where
customer demand also peaks.45
Finally, Appellees argued the Commission unjustifiably reduced the
maximum duration of contracts from 25 years to 15 years.46 Here,
Appellees highlight the interplay between the contract length and rates,
asserting that 15-year contracts, particularly in light of the combined
impact resulting from the Commission’s decision to drastically reduce
rates, are insufficiently long-term to “enhance the economic feasibility”
of qualifying facilities as required by Montana law.47

Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39–40.
Id. at 39.
41
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 14.
42
Id. at 16.
43
Id. at 24.
44
Id. at 25.
45
Id. at 28–30.
46
Id. at 35.
47
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 36 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 69–3–604(2)).
39
40
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Appellees maintain the district court applied the correct standard of
review and provided an appropriate remedy under Montana law.48
Appellees assert the Commission’s decision is controlled by Montana
Code Annotated § 69-3-402; therefore, the Commission’s decision must
be set aside where it is “unlawful or unreasonable.”49 In addition,
Appellees stress courts “may reverse or modify [the Commission’s]
decision” if it is, among other things, “in violation of … statutory
provisions,” “clearly erroneous,” or “arbitrary or capricious.”50 Because
agency action is arbitrary if the agency fails to consider relevant factors,
including the standards and purposes of the statutes the agency
administers, Appellees contend the district court correctly modified the
Commission’s decisions.51
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Montana Supreme Court applies the same standards of review
that a district court applies in reviewing Commission decisions.52 Thus,
the Court is immediately faced with this threshold issue. While the
parties agree the Court must apply the standards of review set forth in
MAPA, the parties disagree on the practical application of such
standards.
Appellants urge the Court to distinguish standards of review in
contested case decisions, i.e., MAPA decisions, from those in used in
informal agency decisions, i.e., non-MAPA decisions.53 Appellants cite
to NorthWestern Corporation v. Montana Department of Public Service
Regulation54 as support for this proposition.55 In NorthWestern
Corporation, the Court explained “[a] district court reviews an
administrative decision in a contested case to determine whether the
agency’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its
interpretation of the law is correct.”56 The case further stands for
Appellants’ assertion that “findings of fact are clearly erroneous if (1)
they are not supported by substantial record evidence; (2) if supported,
whether the Commission nonetheless misapprehended the effect of the
evidence; and (3) if supported and not misapprehended, this Court is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”57
48

Id. at 43.
Id. at 11.
50
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)).
51
Id. at 12–13.
52
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10.
53
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39–40.
54
380 P.3d 787 (Mont. 2016).
55
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39.
56
380 P.3d at 793–94 (quoting Williamson v. Montana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 272 P.3d 71, 81 (Mont.
2012)).
57
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39; see also Northwestern, 380 P.3d at 793–94
(quoting Williamson, 272 P.3d at 81).
49
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Appellants argue that these “well-established standards” are
distinguishable from informal agency decisions, which the Court reviews
on an “arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial
evidence” standard.58 However, Appellants’ attempt to distinguish
MAPA decisions from non-MAPA decisions is plagued by the fact that
NorthWestern Corporation acknowledges that, under MAPA, “the court
may reverse or modify the agency decision if the ‘substantial rights’ of
the appellant were prejudiced because the administrative findings are . . .
‘arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.’”59 MAPA does not preclude use of
an arbitrary standard; on the contrary, MAPA expressly enumerates it.60
In contrast, Appellees, relying on Montana Code Annotated § 2–4–
704(2), assert the “arbitrary or capricious” standard applicable in MAPA
decisions is interchangeable from the “arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or
not supported by substantial evidence” standard employed in non-MAPA
cases.61 Appellees further urge the Court to adopt the factor analysis set
forth in Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Department of Environmental
Quality,62 a non-MAPA case.63 In Clark Fork Coalition, the Court held
“in examining whether an agency decision applying a regulation was
arbitrary or capricious, the courts consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment.”64 Certainly, the specific language of
Clark Fork Coalition limits the holding to non-MAPA decisions by
stating “[w]e review an agency decision not classified as a contested case
under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act to determine whether
the decision was ‘arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by
substantial evidence.’”65 However, the Court has already extended
MAPA standards in similar areas, such as by applying MAPA’s standard
of review extensively to local government decisions.66 Practically
speaking, the substantial overlap in language between the two standards
suggests implementation of the factor test may be appropriate under
MAPA.
It is anticipated that the Court will find the district court was within
its authority to vacate and modify the Commission decisions as arbitrary
Cross-Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 39–40.
380 P.3d at 794 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)(ii)–(vi) (2019)).
60
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)(vi).
61
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 13.
62
197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008).
63
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 13.
64
197 P.3d at 488.
65
Id. at 487 (quoting Johansen v. State, 983 P.2d 962, 965 (Mont. 1999)).
66
Community Assoc. for North Shore Conservation, Inc. v. Flathead Cty, 445 P.3d 1195, 1204
(Mont. 2019); see also Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 230 P.3d 808 (Mont. 2010); Kiely
Constr. LLC v. City of Red Lodge, 57 P.3d 836 (Mont. 2002).
58
59
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without needing to address implementation of the factor test for MAPA
decisions. Under Montana Code Annotated § 2-4-704(2), the district
court has the right to reverse or modify the Commission’s decision if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are: (i) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (ii) in excess of the
statutory authority of the agency; (iii) made upon unlawful procedure;
(iv) affected by other error of law; (v) clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (vi)
arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.67
The district court’s order addresses the Commission’s decisions
through these frameworks, holding: (1) the Commission lacked
substantial evidence necessary to determine 15-year contracts are
significantly long-term, as a majority of Commissioners admitted the
evidentiary record on this issue was inadequate; (2) the Commission
acted arbitrarily in in departing from the recent Commission practice of
including avoided carbon costs in QF rates without providing any
explanation; and (3) the Commission acted arbitrarily in setting the solar
capacity contribution at 6.1% because it discounted record evidence
demonstrating NorthWestern’s substantial summertime capacity needs,
as evidenced by the fact that NorthWestern’s summer peak demand
exceeded winter peak demand in nearly half of the years evaluated.68
Should the Court determine the standard of review principles for
MAPA and non-MAPA cases are interchangeable, the Court is even
more likely to affirm the district court’s decision based on the
Commission’s failure to consider relevant factors, such as whether the
agency adequately considered the factors relevant to choosing a rate that
will best serve the purposes of the underlying statutes.
V.

CONCLUSION

This case offers the Montana Supreme Court an opportunity to
clarify the similarly worded doctrines of MAPA and non-MAPA
standards of review. While the case may be resolved on the merits
without reaching this issue, Montana law would benefit from
clarification in this area. As the case involves a matter of first impression
regarding the solar capacity contribution rates, the Court’s holding will
affect utilities; existing small, renewable energy facilities; developers
and investors; and consumers residing in Montana.

67
68

MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–4–704(2)(vi) (2019).
Order, supra note 25, at 6, 9–10, 12.

